TRANSFORMATION OF INSTALLATION MANAGEMENT: AN ANALYSIS OF ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE
The Army is a continuously transforming organization and it is critical for Army strategic leaders to comprehend the dynamics of organizational change. 1 As one of the largest "corporations" in the Western world, the Department of Defense (DOD) provides many opportunities for the study of organizational change. Analyzing the factors that lead to policy modifications or changes to processes within the DOD is an opportunity for Army strategic leaders to enhance their professional development.
The purpose of this paper is to examine such a process -the establishment of the Army Installation Management Agency (IMA). This paper uses elements of organizational development theory to help explain how and why change occurred within the Army installation management system. 2 Transformation of installation management (TIM) garnered little publicity compared with the more visible, combat aspects of transformation. However, the TIM is essential to the Army's successful transformation. In order to analyze the dynamics that led to the decision to form a new field operating agency subordinate to the Army staff, it is necessary to borrow concepts from the body of literature on organizations. Contingency theory provides a simple, compelling framework for tracing the complex processes that lead to organizational change. It is based on three broad assumptions. First, there is no single best way to organize. Second, not all ways of organizing are equally effective. And, lastly and most importantly, the best way to organize depends on the nature of the environment to which the organization relates. 4 The premise is that just as a living thing interacts and adapts with its surroundings to survive, so do organizations that perform well over time.
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This paper uses these assumptions as well as three central concepts drawn from the contingency theory of organizational development. First, the organization functions and interacts within contextual and task environments. Second, an organization's ability to adapt to the respective environments is essential to success. Third, adaptation is largely a result of a leader's decision, or choice. 6 An organization interacts with the environment through its leadership, structure and culture. Structure is the established pattern of relationships among the components or parts of the organization, managed by authorized leadership. 7 The culture of an organization consists of the shared values, assumptions and personal beliefs of its members, largely shaped by its leaders. These concepts exist in constant interaction and are referred to collectively in organizational literature as organizational dynamics. 8 Similar concepts are found in Army and Joint military doctrinal publications. 9 Therefore, this theoretical framework provides a relevant model for use in studying change in military organizations.
The environment in which an organization functions is a very significant consideration in studying organizational changes. It is a factor in organizational dynamics at every level of analysis whether internal or external to an organization structure. Organizations conduct routine, daily operations within its task environment. In military terms, the task environment is similar to tactical-level operations. In the case of Army installations, it is the daily routine of communicating with and executing the intent of higher headquarters while providing support and services to tenant units, military families and retirees. The task environment is defined by the daily interaction of the organization with its customers, competitors, government agencies and private contractors.
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Organizations are also impacted directly and indirectly by the contextual environment.
The contextual environment is similar to the military concept of the operational and strategic level of operations. It consists of the interaction and/or influence of political, social, economic, cultural and demographic aspects of the higher headquarters and society as a whole.
Environmental factors influence the nature of organizational structure and culture, particularly in bureaucratic organizations. 11 For Army installations, the laws, regulations and expectations of the Department of the Army (DA) and the DOD constitute the primary contextual environment.
In addition, the contextual environment of Army installations is often influenced by U.S.
domestic politics and international affairs.
In the last half of the 20 th century there was rapid growth in the study of organizations, both in academia and by business leaders. Intense business competition induced by the growing globalization of markets intensified the demand for a greater understanding of organizations and how to make them more profitable. Much of the theoretical discourse on organizations is based on other scientific disciplines ranging from biology to ecology. It has been adapted for application to develop compelling models for the study of organizations. While primarily focused on business enterprises, it can be useful for leaders in the military and other government agencies interested in leading and managing organizational change.
The DOD and Army Installations: Late 1980s through the 1990s. national security strategy. In domestic political and media circles there was talk of taking a "peace dividend"--a realignment of funds from defense to domestic programs. 16 In the early 1990s, the domestic economic and political environment was under stress from international economic competition and growing uncertainty that was predicted a decade or so before 17 . Specifically, the U.S. was beginning to transition from an industrial economy based on manufacturing to one characterized more by commerce based on information and services. 18 Efficiency became an imperative for businesses, and remains a dominant theme in business and government literature today. With the rising costs of production in the U.S. and the lower cost competition in other countries, achieving efficiency, in order to achieve lower overhead costs, became a hallmark of successful business.
The DOD budgets of the early to middle 1990s declined steadily within this economic environment. At the same time, in late 1990, the U.S. deployed military forces to Saudi Arabia.
In January, 1991, the U.S. launched OPERATION DESERT STORM in order to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi occupation. Despite the fact that the campaign in Kuwait was the largest of its kind since Vietnam and involved every branch of service in the DOD, the U.S. continued to actively plan for force structure reductions and cuts in defense spending. 19 Implementation of these plans to cut force structure began immediately following the return of forces from the Persian Gulf 20 .
In the wake of the victory in Kuwait, the U.S. military implemented major force reductions. 21 As plans for transformation developed, it was clear that the cost of a genuine RMA would strain on the DOD budget beyond its limits.
The downward trend in real defense spending that began in the late 1980s was reinforced by the weakness of the traditional rationale for defense spending. 22 The end of the Cold War in 1989 was the most significant change in the international system since the end of World War II.
While a benchmark in the history of U.S. foreign policy, the strategic implications of U.S. success over the USSR had an immediate impact on domestic politics in the United States.
The end of the bi-polar struggle left the U.S. as the world's lone superpower with no clear and present danger from a peer competitor. This new international environment presented
American leaders with the challenge of identifying a viable threat on which to base defense planning.
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The uncertain international threat made defense budget projections increasingly more difficult. The central question of the early 1990s was how useful is a large, expensive Army, when there appeared to be a significant reduction in the threat to national security. This question was central to both the executive and legislative branches. Political pressure on both branches of government to make the federal government more efficient and effective continued.
As the 1990s began, the uncertain threat and associated ambiguity of military usefulness in a resource constrained environment made the DOD a politically attractive target for budget cuts. Business was largely viewed as more efficient than government. Base closings prior to the1970s represented efforts to save operating costs. Outside of the government, the private business sector was experiencing similar pressures on resources that were cutting into profit margins. By the mid-1990s, regardless of political affiliation, politicians used the idea of making government more efficient as a theme for rallying support.
In order to compete in the growing world economy, achieving maximum efficiency became The Bush administration followed the 1990 budget with a budget proposal in 1991 that failed to keep up with inflation-the sixth consecutive annual reduction. In spite of these reductions, there was considerable political and economic pressure to make further cuts. 29 After shutting the government down over Columbus Day and conducting bi-partisan negotiations, the final defense budget was approved at roughly 7 percent less that the previous year. 30 As a result, installation funding, along with other Army programs, continued to fall.
The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) of 1997 provides a clear picture of the growing problem with installations. A good example of these issues was meeting the growing needs of increasing numbers of married military members. 31 The 1997 By the late 1990s, the Army installation situation was beginning to get the attention of political leaders. 35 The testimony given by senior Army leaders at congressional hearings during this period indicate that legislators were developing more interest in the poor state of Army installations. Operational unit funding was the priority through this decade. 36 Senior
Army leaders made it clear that installation infrastructure was bearing the brunt of the budget constraints. But as 2000 neared, the choice to use the installation as one of the bill payers for operational costs was a diminishing option. Instead, retention, readiness and recruiting statistics were beginning to indicate that there was a growing crisis caused by the decline in Army purchasing power, the emotional costs of high operations tempo, and poor funding support. Critics argued that the Army would not be able to find enough internal savings to fund the planned transformation. 41 The gap in resources caused by the increased operations tempo during a period of decreasing force structure and funding was exacerbated by a crisis in the deteriorating condition of the Army installation infrastructure. Suffering from years of insufficient funding, the facilities, ranges, housing, and quality of life programs that form the core of the Army's hometowns were in poor condition. Funding dipped to its lowest in 1995. Overall, the installation real property maintenance (RPM) accounts were often funded at 50 percent or less in the 1990s.
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Following Joint Vision 2010, the DOD-level long range modernization program, Army
Vision XXI included a long range plan for installations called Installation Vision XXI. In testimony, senior leaders acknowledged that one of the greatest challenges is "balancing today's readiness and tomorrow's modernization requirements". 43 The five tenets of Installation Vision XXI were: maintain readiness; provide power projection; maintain quality of life; sustain the environment; and operate efficiently. Summarized as accomplishing the mission and operating efficiently, these tenets would serve as the new IMA core tasks five years later.
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The DOD and Army Installations Since 2000
By the late 1990s, the overall funding trend showed signs of improvement. From 1996 through 2000, funding for the Army grew, but remained well behind the installation requirements. However, the damage caused by decades of shortfalls in funding was done.
Modest incremental increases resulted in little improvement in the overall condition of installations. Infrastructure maintenance is a "pay me now, or pay me later" situation according to MG Van Antwerp. 45 Like the damage caused to a poorly maintained motor in an automobile, deferring relatively low cost periodic expenditures on infrastructure can exponentially increase the cost of reversing the trend.
46
Nothing transforms in the US like the change of political power and a new administration.
In the fall of 2000, President George W. Bush was elected. His new cabinet assumed its duties with new leadership. This new cabinet accelerated the DOD transformation effort and the decade's long campaign to make the DOD more efficient. Making government more accountable remains a common thread shared by the current administration with those of the last three decades of the 20 th century. 47 Nearly a year prior to his presidential election, thenGovernor George Bush announced that his administration would reform the DOD. 48 The transformation of DOD would make it possible to truly do more with less by becoming more efficient through management processes developed and practiced in the corporate world.
As the new administration assumed its duties, more negative data surfaced regarding the While effective in improving well-being standards at individual installations and data collection at the national level, respectively, these constituted incremental management interventions that failed to fix the core problem.
Senior mission commanders at each installation often faced the difficult decision on whether to fund housing maintenance or fund unit training. Senior mission commanders at each installation chose to fund unit training and operations rather than reinvesting in infrastructure.
However, there were years when the overwhelming need on installations combined with the shortage of funds resulted in the transfer of funds from training and operations accounts to installation accounts. After years of this practice, deferred maintenance and the costs of growing dilapidation continued to grow.
As we have seen, the change in structure that began with the establishment of the IMA in The role of leadership in the "transformation of installation management" is best viewed in light of how the environment and structure worked to constrain leaders for decades. Efforts by leaders to incrementally influence the installation management funding problem resemble a doctor who receives just enough medicine to keep a dying patient alive but incapacitated. The senior mission commanders (SMC) attempted to balance, as best they could with constrained budgets, to meet the requirements of training and equipping the war fighters while providing for the sustainment of base operations.
The mission of the Army is ultimately to fight and win the wars of the United States. It is logical that the top priority for funding throughout in the1980s and the 1990s was readiness and training. The diversion of funds from installation accounts to operational unit accounts was an accepted practice. It was considered more desirable than to let unit training suffer. Although rare, there were instances in the 1990s when commanders were forced by necessity to move funds in the opposite direction--from unit training to support installation shortcomings. 60 Army culture served as screening criteria for commanders who found themselves in funding dilemmas in the 1990s. Few would divert significant funds from training and operations accounts to installation management. 61 This led to an organizational crisis that could not be ignored by the Army, the DOD or the Congress.
Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger wrote in the 1960s that bureaucracies tend to avoid decisions until a crisis is imminent. Until facts bearing on a problem are clear and unambiguous, a bureaucratic organization will not act. As leadership scholar, Burns asserts, oftentimes, "an organization trades creativity for certainty. 62 In the installation funding problem, incremental interventions which amounted to transferring money back and forth between unit and installation accounts simply mitigated the short term effects. The decisions to migrate funding between accounts, or robbing Peter to pay Paul, were made at the MACOM and installation level. Local installation problems were managed locally and within the MACOM, regardless of the fact that the organizational structure crux of the problem lay at the DOD level. 63 In order for organizations to effectively adapt to the environment, the leadership must continuously scan the organization environment and effectively interpret the implications of task and contextual environmental changes. 64 Rather than restructure installation management to meet the changes caused by long term budget contextual and task environment, installation commanders were trapped by structural constraints. Incremental efforts to keep the installations operating at an acceptable standard, just to get through another fiscal year, had the cumulative effect of compounding the long term problem like consumer credit does to debt. And yet, as we have shown, by the turn of the century, objective data indicated that poor infrastructure and deteriorating installation quality of life was causing reduced retention rates and declining unit readiness.
The ineffectiveness of senior Army leadership efforts to address the issue with more than incremental measures was largely due to structural boundaries. 65 The imbalance between high OPTEMPO and available resources that contributed to budget strains that led to the decline in installation infrastructure, also impacted negatively on soldiers, unit training and family quality of life. 66 The quality of training suffered too, as longer more frequent deployments combined with poor funding of training ranges and training facilities.
In addition, as an all-volunteer force, the rising average age of soldiers and a corresponding higher number of soldiers with families placed additional stress on the quantity and quality of housing. The ALTDP study provided the senior leadership with an objective measurement of the seriousness of this problem. Efforts at the highest levels of the Army and the DOD were taken in the early 2000s to address these issues. This mobilization of senior leadership to the issues and importance of human resources of the Army served to add momentum to the growing culture of transformation that began in the early 1990s. Opportunity for significant change to the structure of installation management was growing. Army. 67 However, it is reasonable to note that the timing of the NSS and its content in relation to the domestic and international political environments compelled the leaders within DOD and its departments to act. The crisis in the first year after the 9/11 attacks combined with the effects of several years of transformation themes within the Army facilitated change. The Army, seeking to address the readiness, recruiting and retention challenges acted to make change permanent.
International events increased political opportunity for the President and the Secretary of
Defense to rapidly build coalitions at the highest levels to accelerate change. The international environment demonstrated that conflict did not end in 1989, but as some predicted, it continued and in ways not compatible with the traditional western way of war. 68 For years, the Army worked on plans, funded research, developed concepts and conducted experiments in an effort to transform the Army. At the core of the Army's effort was the objective of being prepared for future adversaries. This effort tended to strain the limited resources discussed previously, placing more pressure on installations to find ways to cut operating costs. While the public perception of Army transformation was largely dominated in the 90s by the impact of technology, the human dimension of transformation received growing attention in the late 1990s. It is within the human dimension that transformation of the culture in the Army began.
If we define structure as the "established pattern of relationships among the components or parts of the organization," 69 we can see how structural considerations led to a crisis in installation management. Since bureaucracies tend to buttress the status quo, the structure of the Army installation management process was both a cause and solution to the funding problem. 70 Installations, like other Army units are resource dependent. Low priority relative to competing requirements for finite resources was the central cause of poor installation conditions. This low priority became structurally and culturally reinforced by norms developed over time by decisions. Resource dependency and the structural processes used in appropriating limited resources may be at the heart of addressing this challenge theoretically and in practical application. The three dynamics of structure, culture, and leadership interacted with the contextual level environment in a way that reinforced the weak funding support for installation management. The structure of the MACOM relationship with the installation appears to have reinforced the default position of commanders who tended to fund installation requirements by exception. Given the Army "can-do" and "mission-first" cultural values, it is no surprise that installations became one of the Army bill payers for the costs of increased operations tempo in the 1990s. 72 Senior leaders tacitly instructed subordinate commanders to fund operational unit requirements at the expense of installation needs.
Years of managing installations through the
MACOMs exist to conduct the tasks dictated by Title X, United States Code (USC).
Training, equipping and organizing units in order to provide combatant commanders with capable fighting forces has implicitly taken precedence over installation management requirements. While this is intuitive to the military professional, the long term effect was Army installations with deteriorated facilities and sub-optimal support and services. Evidence suggests that commanders began to realize this in the early 1990s. 73 Ultimately, installation requirements failed to compete well against the higher priority task and cultural imperative of the MACOM to provide units prepared to fight and win the Nation's wars. This structural relationship militated against leaders' efforts to address the installation resource challenge.
Leaders create organization structures, foster culture and make decisions that can reinforce, change or have little effect on these characteristics. 74 Ironically, organizational structures, also referred to as bureaucracies, resist change. According to John Gardner, "Just about everything in large-scale organization seems to militate against leadership. In the end, the problem was solved by a top-down major intervention. But here again, the role of the environment on decision making is evident. Senior Army leaders began acknowledging well before the IMA decision that substandard conditions on installations had in readiness, retention and recruiting issues. These environmental pressures grew through the 1990s. By 2000, the misalignment of the installation management structure with the environment was significant enough to force senior Army leaders, who may have initially resisted the proposal to transform installation management, to agree to support major organizational change. Some believe that it takes a crisis in alignment between structure and environment to get large government bureaucracies to change. 76 As Army officials looked for innovative ways to fund operations, research and development, and transformation, finding a new way to manage installations more efficiently offered some hope of relieving this pressure.
The implications for Army strategic leaders are best summarized by Goethals territory, commonwealth, or possession, controlled by, and at which an Army unit or activity (Active, Army Reserve, or national Guard) is permanently assigned. They provide a base from which a diverse group of organizations, tasks and missions. They may be referred to with names such as post, camp, station, fort, sub-post, depot, arsenal, proving ground, base, barracks, laboratory, or ammunition plant. No two installations are exactly the same. Mr. Caldera's report emphasized the BRAC process "is the most important tool for decreasing the expenditure of scarce Real Property Maintenance (RPM) dollars on excess infrastructure…the Army strongly supports the DOD request for additional BRAC authorizations". His report supports previous statements by senior leaders in DOD and the Army that highlighted the need to accelerate infrastructure reductions to more closely parallels the force structure decline. In the 1990s, infrastructure reduction lagged more than 10 percent behind the decline in force structure reduction.
requests, the complexity of balancing requirements against the budget realities, prioritization and the continuing effort under the Clinton administration to use BRAC as a tool to cut overhead. In the meantime, the long term savings sought through BRAC failed to address the short term base operations shortfall. 39 These largely unfunded long term plans represented a kind of institutionalized practice of building new plans with no change in resources. This continuity is supported by years of annual congressional testimony and official statements. I reviewed the majority of statements made each year during hearings before congress in the spring time frame. In general, the factual statements reflected the poor state of installations, but were cast in optimistic language, probably attributable to the Army culture. We cannot fault the senior leadership for failing to plan. However, a plan without resources is difficult to execute. th Cong., "Hearing on Improving Readiness Capabilities", 13 March 1998. This pre-9/11 testimony highlights the Army plan to take steps complement the Army Vision XXI modernization plan with a plan to improve Army installations. 44 Ibid, 3. 
